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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - FEDERAL COURT lNJUNC• 
noN AGAINST STATE OFFICER To SUPPRESS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
IN A STATE COURT-Federal customs enforcement officers suspected plain-
tiff of theft from a waterfront pier. In the course of their investigation 
they searched plaintiff's home without a search warrant and detained 
plaintiff for questioning without first bringing him before a federal 
commissioner. Both acts violated the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.1 Defendant, a state officer, although not a participant in the 
search, was present during the illegal detention at the invitation of the 
federal officers. Plaintiff obtained an order in federal district court en-
joining defendant from giving any testimony or producing any evidence 
in state criminal proceedings against him with respect to property illegally 
seized during the search and to statements obtained during the illegal 
detention.2 On appeal, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. In the exer-
cise of its supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies 
a federal court has the power to enjoin a state official from testifying 
in a state proceeding to information obtained by federal officers in an 
illegal search and an illegal detention. Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 
(2d Cir. 1961). 
In Rea v. United State.s3 the Supreme Court held that a federal court, 
in the exercise of its discretion as a court of equity, should enjoin a 
federal officer from testifying in a state criminal trial with respect to 
evidence obtained by him under an invalid search warrant. Equitable 
relief was warranted in that case because the state court at that time 
admitted illegally obtained evidence;4 thus there was no adequate remedy 
at law against the federal officers' violation of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Putting all constitutional questions aside, the Court 
derived the power to issue an injunction from its supervisory control over 
federal law enforcement agencies and its correlative duty to enforce the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 But federal courts have declined 
to enjoin state officers in similar situations.6 In Stefanelli v. Minard1 
the Supreme Court refused to enjoin state officers from testifying in a 
1 Fro. R. CRIM. P. 5 (a), 41. 
2 Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
3 350 U.S. 214 (1956). 
4 When plaintiff applied for the injunction in the principal case, illegally obtained 
evidence was admissible in New York courts. People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 
857, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959). 
G See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332 (1943). 
6 Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 449 (1957) (per curiam) involved evidence obtained 
by state officers in violation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103 
(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). In Doyle v. Webb, 237 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1956), the 
evidence was obtained by state officers during a forcible search without a warrant. 
7 342 U.S. ll7 (1951). 
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state court about evidence which they had obtained in an illegal 
search and seizure. The decision was based on the Court's concern for 
the preservation of the balance between the protection of federal rights 
and the state's administration of its own laws.8 The importance of the 
latter interest was emphasized in Pugach v. Dollinger9 where the Supreme 
Court, on the basis of Stefanelli, affirmed a federal district court's refusal 
to enjoin state officers from testifying in a state criminal trial with respect 
to wiretap evidence they had obtained in violation of the Federal 
Communications Act.10 Although plaintiff had been deprived of a 
federally created right, the Court held that this violation was not sufficient 
to warrant interference with state criminal proceedings. 
The problem in the principal case arises from the fact that the 
fruits of the illegal federal search and detention were passed on to the 
state through defendant before the trial. I£ the suppression of evidence 
is to remain an effective deterrent against illegal activity by federal 
officers,11 the injunction must issue against a state officer and will therefore 
interfere to some extent with the administration of state criminal pro-
ceedings, a result which the Stefanelli rule was designed to prevent. 
Although the court distinguishes Stefanelli by explaining that defendant 
is enjoined, not in his capacity as a state officer, but only as an invited 
observer of illegal federal activity, this distinction has little practical 
significance. Regardless of the label given to the defendant, the injunc-
tion has a definite limiting effect on state court proceedings, especially 
where the state's case is based entirely on the evidence and testimony 
in question. 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the court may safely rely on 
the Rea rationale. Although the assertion in Rea that "no injunction 
is sought against a state official"12 may have been intended merely to 
emphasize the limited scope of the holding, it might easily be read 
as a reaffirmation of the Stefanelli rule, or at least as a hint that the 
Supreme Court was not prepared to enjoin a state officer in this 
situation.13 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. 
Schnettler14 leaves some doubt about the factors necessary to justify 
federal equity intervention. In that case the Court affirmed a federal 
s Congressional concern for this balance may be seen in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958): "A 
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceeding in a State 
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid 
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 
9 365 U.S. 458 (1961) (per curiam). 
10 § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). 
11 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
12 350 U.S. at 216, 217. 
13 See Doyle v. Webb, 237 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1956). 
14 365 U.S. 381 (1961). 
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district court's refusal to enjoin a federal officer from testifying in a 
state criminal trial concerning evidence obtained in a search made with-
out a search warrant on the ground that plaintiff had failed to allege 
that the search was made without probable cause. However, the Court 
went on to distinguish Rea on the fact that the plaintiff there had 
previously obtained a federal injunction suppressing the illegally seized 
evidence in a federal court. The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice 
Stewart15 and the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas16 indicate 
that the absence of prior suppression at the federal level in Wilson was a 
material factor in the majority's refusal to authorize the injunction. 
If this is so, the Wilson decision represents a retreat from the Rea position17 
and leaves the court in the principal case, where there were no prior 
federal proceedings, with little authority to expand the application of 
the Rea doctrine. 
Although the search of plaintiff's home was apparently a violation of 
the fourth amendment,18 the majority characterized the search only as a 
violation of the federal rules and thus avoided the implications of Mapp 
v. Ohio,10 which holds that a state court must exclude all evidence obtained 
in an unconstitutional search and seizure. The legal remedy pro;ided by 
Mapp would seem to eliminate the justification for suppressing the evi-
dence obtained in the illegal search and would therefore limit the scope of 
the injunction to the evidence obtained during the illegal detention. 
The circuit court's failure to recognize the potential constitutional violation 
suggests that Mapp may be avoided as a bar to a federal injunction sup-
pressing evidence if the party seeking the injunction purposely ignores the 
constitutional aspects of the search and pleads only the federal rules 
violation. 
15 Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 388 (1961). 
10 Ibid. 
S. Anthony Benton 
17 Sec George, "The Potent, the Omnipresent Teacher": The Supreme Court and 
Wiretapping, 47 VA. L. REv. 751, 784 (1961). 
18 The district court held that the search was "illegal," 189 F. Supp. at 254. But it 
is not clear whether "illegal," as opposed to "unreasonable," refers to a violation of 
the fourth amendment or only to a violation of the federal rules. Judge Anderson, 
dissenting from the Second Circuit's decision, believes the words arc synonymous. 
Principal case at 371. 
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . 
